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File No. 004The Wreck Files

The 1950 Kew Gardens Train Crash

“The Signal Wasn't His”

Kew Gardens, Queens, New York

November 22, 1950 · about 6:29 p.m.

On the night before Thanksgiving, two packed Long Island Rail Road commuter trains left Penn Station four minutes apart. Near Kew Gardens the first one stopped on the track. The second came around the curve behind it and hit it at about 30 miles an hour.

▶ The Signal Wasn't His: The 1950 Kew Gardens Train Crash · watch on YouTube
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Killed
78
Injured
363
Railroad
Long Island Rail Road · Trains No. 780 and No. 174

Thanksgiving Eve

In 1950 the Long Island Rail Road was one of the busiest railroads in the country and one of the most worn out. Owned by the Pennsylvania, it had been bankrupt for more than a year. Its riders traveled in steel electric cars built around 1910. On Wednesday, November 22, the night before Thanksgiving, the trains were full.

Two of them left Penn Station four minutes apart on the same track: No. 780 to Hempstead, and behind it No. 174 to Babylon, twelve cars each. Ahead lay a long curve, Kew Gardens station and a straight run toward Jamaica.

Signals made of lights

On this railroad, signals weren't red, yellow and green. They were rows of amber lights, and the meaning was in the angle. Three on a diagonal meant Approach: slow down and be ready to stop at the next signal. Three across with one below meant Stop and Proceed: stop, then go on at restricted speed. Restricted speed meant something exact: 15 mph at most, ready to stop short of another train. On this stretch there was no signal inside the cab, only the ones beside the track.

A train stopped in the dark

No. 780 got a Restricting aspect at the signal bridge over all four tracks. Its engineer braked, released at about 15 mph, but the train kept braking until it stopped. He believed the brakes hadn't released, tried to reset them, and finally made an emergency application, which takes time to release. At about 6:26, twelve full cars stood dark on the main line.

The rules said that when a train stops and another may be coming behind, the flagman must go back at once, far enough, with torpedoes on the rail and fusees if needed. No. 780's flagman took a lit red lantern and stepped down. A few steps out he heard current going into the motors, thought the train was about to move and climbed back aboard. It didn't move. When he was about to go down again, he saw a headlight on the straight, about 1,000 feet away.

The signal that wasn't his

Four minutes later, No. 174 reached the same signal and got Stop and Proceed. Its engineer stopped and started again slowly. From there he could see the signal bridge more than three quarters of a mile ahead, and as he came on it changed from Restricting to Approach: the train beyond No. 780 had moved on. But that signal spoke only about the track beyond the bridge, not the stretch in between, where No. 780 was still standing. From behind, in the dark, it looked like good news. The conductor felt the train speed up to almost 35 mph near Kew Gardens. Then the emergency brakes went on.

At about 6:29, No. 174 struck the rear of No. 780 at about 30 mph. The last car of the stopped train rode up and its steel frame sheared through the top of No. 174's first car, almost end to end. Both cars were forty years old. The engineer of No. 174 and 77 passengers died, and 363 people were injured. It took more than five hours to bring out the last survivors.

What changed after Kew Gardens

The ICC's finding fit in a line: the following train was not operated in accordance with the signal indication. Why the engineer went faster than 15 mph could not be determined, because he died. But the report also looked at the railroad: on other stretches the LIRR had cab signals, which here would have shown Restricting the whole way, and the cars already carried the equipment. Nine months earlier, at Rockville Centre, another LIRR collision had killed more than thirty people on a stretch where cab signals did work. Warning was not enough, the ICC concluded. Trains needed a system that would hold them to low speed whenever they entered an occupied block.

Three days after the wreck, Governor Dewey named a commission to examine the LIRR. Within weeks the railroad announced a six-million-dollar safety program, including automatic speed control, which began to enter service in May 1951. It is still the deadliest wreck in the Long Island Rail Road's history.

Sources

Interstate Commerce Commission, Ex Parte No. 176, Accident near Jamaica, N.Y. (December 18, 1950). The full list of sources is in the description of the video. Read the original report below ↓

Original recordPublic domain

Read the original ICC report

ICC Ex Parte No. 176: Accident near Jamaica, N.Y.

Decided December 18, 1950 · 11 pages · PDF, 0.6 MB

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