One track, two trains
The Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway ran double track from Nashville to a place called Shops, two and a half miles out. From there it was single track in both directions, with no automatic signals and no block system: just the timetable, written orders and the judgment of the crews.
On the morning of July 9, 1918, Train No. 1 was coming in from Memphis about half an hour late. It had the right of way. Train No. 4 was going out to Memphis and had to stay out of its way.
Who was on board
The United States had been at war for more than a year. DuPont was building one of the largest smokeless powder plants in the world at Old Hickory, next to Nashville, and it needed thousands of workers. On No. 1, in segregated cars, rode more than a hundred Black laborers from across the South, on their way to the plant. Those cars were made of wood.
Know, not assume
Rule 83 said no train could leave double track for single track until it knew that the trains with the right of way had arrived. Six weeks earlier, a bulletin had tightened it: identify No. 1 by sight, or get an order at Shops. But there was no train register at Shops, so crews relied on a habit: the orders named No. 1's engine, 281, and if you saw it go by, you knew. The ICC called that habit wholly inadequate as a safeguard.
No. 4 left at 7:07. Its conductor read the orders and went to collect tickets on a packed train. He heard a train pass through the yard and assumed it was No. 1. He never saw it, and no one told him. In the tower at Shops, the operator didn't know whether No. 1 had arrived and didn't check his train sheet. The signal was clear. At 7:15, No. 4 passed it.
The collision at Dutchman's Curve
Past Shops, the line ran straight for about 4,000 feet and then curved downhill to Dutchman's Curve. No. 1 was coming the other way, also downhill, at about 50 mph. A cut up to 15 feet deep, a highway bridge and a curve hid each train from the other. According to the ICC, the engineers could not have seen each other in time.
Both locomotives left the track and their boilers tore loose from the frames. The wooden cars telescoped, one driving into the next. Both engineers and both firemen died. The ICC counted 101 dead: 87 passengers and 14 employees. Newspapers at the time printed higher numbers.
What the ICC report said
The ICC blamed No. 4's engineer and conductor for occupying the main track when a superior train was due, and called the conductor's assumption extremely negligent. But it went further: the railroad gave its crews no reliable way to know where the other train was. A manual block system, properly run, would have prevented the wreck. There were telegraph offices along the whole line and, in the ICC's words, no valid excuse for not using them. With steel cars, it said, far fewer people would have died.
Engineer David Kennedy's widow sued and won in the Tennessee courts. In 1924 the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed: in an opinion by Justice Holmes, it held that making sure the other train had passed was the engineer's own duty.
Sources
ICC Bureau of Safety, report on the accident at Nashville, Tenn., July 9, 1918 (August 16, 1918). The full list of sources is in the description of the video. Read the original report below ↓


